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Ahead of the U.S. 2020 presidential election, the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace convened more than 100 experts from three dozen 
organizations inside and outside Silicon Valley in private meetings to help address 
the challenges that synthetic and manipulated media pose for industry, 
government, and society more broadly. Among other things, the meetings 
developed a common understanding of the potential for synthetic and manipulated 
media circulated on technology platforms to disrupt the upcoming presidential 
election, generated definitions of “inappropriate” election-related synthetic and 
manipulated media that have informed platform content moderation policies, and 
equipped platforms with playbooks of effective and ethical responses to synthetic 
and manipulated media. Carnegie commissioned four short papers on the legal, 
ethical, and efficacy dimensions of election-related synthetic and manipulated 




Digital falsifications pose dangers for social media, governments, and society. In 
particular, the rise of “digitized impersonations” increasingly concern lawmakers 
and scholars who recognize the risks they pose to both individuals and society.1 To 
address these risks, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace convened a 
series of meetings aimed at reducing opportunities for digital forgeries to subvert 
the upcoming 2020 U.S. election. This memo informs the series by outlining the 
potential legal implications of synthetic or manipulated media with a view to 
helping platforms define what constitutes proper and improper digital falsifications 
in the context of the election. 
 
Media can take various forms, and rapidly developing technology will surely lead 
to new types in the future. This memo focuses on just two kinds: synthetic media 
and manipulated media. For the purposes of this series, “synthetic media”—
sometimes called deepfakes—are digital falsifications of images, video, and audio 
created using an editing process that is automated through AI techniques, whereas 
“manipulated media” are any other digital falsification of images, video, and 
audio.2 
 
Not all uses of synthetic or manipulated media are harmful. Indeed, they can serve 
many laudable purposes. Consider, for example, the enhancements they could 
bring in the realm of education. In teaching about the assassination of former 
president John F. Kennedy, these media could allow people to hear the speech he 
was due to give on the day of his death in his own voice, as one UK-based 
company has now done.3 Similarly, imagine the powerful artistic uses of these 
media, such as the digital manipulation in Forrest Gump where doctored video 
footage portrayed three past presidents saying things they never said.4 Synthetic 
and manipulated media can also enhance autonomy and equality, particularly for 
people with disabilities who might use the technology to virtually engage with life 
experiences that would be impossible in a conventional sense.5 Moreover, these 
media can spur valuable political speech, as when a Belgian political party created 
a deepfake depicting U.S. President Donald Trump giving a fictional address 
where he says: “As you know I had the balls to withdraw from the Paris climate 
agreement. And so should you.”6 Although Trump never used those words in 
abandoning the agreement, the political party used this tool to “start a public 
debate” to “draw attention to the necessity to act on climate change.”7 
But some digital falsifications are not so salutary. Indeed, many uses could lead to 
grave individual and social harms—particularly in the political context. Consider 
this list of hypothetical scenarios catalogued by Robert Chesney and Danielle 
Citron: 
• Fake videos could feature public officials taking bribes, displaying racism, 
or engaging in adultery. 
• Politicians and other government officials could appear in locations where 
they were not, saying or doing horrific things that they did not. 
• Fake videos could place them in meetings with spies or criminals, launching 
public outrage, criminal investigations, or both. 
• Soldiers could be shown murdering innocent civilians in a war zone, 
precipitating waves of violence and even strategic harms to a war effort. 
• A deep fake might falsely depict a white police officer shooting an unarmed 
black man while shouting racial epithets. 
• A fake audio clip might “reveal” criminal behavior by a candidate on the eve 
of an election. 
• Falsified video appearing to show a Muslim man at a local mosque 
celebrating the Islamic State could stoke distrust of, or even violence 
against, that community. 
• A fake video might portray an Israeli official doing or saying something so 
inflammatory as to cause riots in neighboring countries, potentially 
disrupting diplomatic ties or sparking a wave of violence. 
• False audio might convincingly depict U.S. officials privately “admitting” a 
plan to commit an outrage overseas, exquisitely timed to disrupt an 
important diplomatic initiative. 
• A fake video might depict emergency officials “announcing” an impending 
missile strike on Los Angeles or an emergent pandemic in New York City, 
provoking panic and worse.8 
 
Falsifications like these could spread with devastating effect during election 
season. They could erode the public’s sense of trust in the news—or even in the 
very idea of truth—upon which an informed electorate depends. Worse still, a 
well-timed release of a convincing digital falsification could sway an election if 
enough voters believed it and the candidate had no time to debunk it effectively. 
What are the potential legal responses to digital falsifications? An outright legal 
ban on synthetic and manipulated media would violate the First Amendment 
because “falsity alone” does not remove expression from First Amendment 
protection, and many digital falsifications would be constitutionally protected 
speech.9 As a result, the mere specter of the First Amendment curtails many 
legislative efforts to regulate these media. Nevertheless, the following legal 
regimes have the potential to address certain problems posed by digital 
falsifications in ways consistent with the First Amendment.10 
 
Intellectual Property: One potential source of legal liability could be copyright law. 
Because some digital falsifications rely on copyrighted content, unauthorized use 
of that content could lead to monetary damages and a notice-and-takedown 
procedure to remove it. The person who created the content usually owns the 
copyright, and thus a person may have a legal claim if she is depicted in synthetic 
or manipulated media that uses material of her own creation. Significant legal 
hurdles will arise, however, because defendants will argue that the falsification is 
“fair use” of the copyrighted material, intended for educational, artistic, or other 
expressive purposes—a defense to liability under copyright law that in part turns 
on the question whether the falsification is sufficiently “transformed” from the 
original such that it receives protection. 
 
Right of Publicity: Another option might be the right of publicity—a state-law tort 
that prohibits unauthorized use of a person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of 
identity.11 Again, however, many digital falsifications will be immune from 
liability under this tort because of First Amendment concerns, as well as related 
statutory and common-law exceptions for material that is “newsworthy” or in the 
“public interest.”12 Some states also restrict the tort’s scope to “commercial” uses 
of a person’s identity, such as in advertisements, meaning that many digital 
falsifications in the election context will not be covered. Despite these 
constitutional barriers, claims brought against creators of digital falsifications that 
inflict grave dignitary harms might survive First Amendment scrutiny, though this 
theory has not been tested in the courts.13 
 
Defamation & False Light: A more fruitful avenue might be civil tort claims for 
defamation and false light, which target certain types of falsehoods. Public officials 
and public figures could sue if a convincing digital falsification amounted to a 
defamatory statement of fact made with actual malice—that is, made with 
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to its 
falsity.14 Private individuals, meanwhile, need show only that the creator was 
negligent as to the falsity of any defamatory statement. Similarly, liability could 
arise if a digital falsification places a person in a “false light” by creating a harmful 
and false implication in the public’s eye, though the victim would have to show 
actual malice if the falsification was related to a “matter of public concern.”15 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED): A final tort that might come 
into play is IIED, but only if the creator of a piece of synthetic or manipulated 
media “intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that 
caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.”16 This is a high bar to 
meet, made higher by First Amendment concerns: as in defamation, a public 
figure’s IIED claim resting on allegations of falsity must satisfy the strictures of 
actual malice, and there is also robust constitutional protection for satire and 
speech on matters of public concern.17 
 
Criminal Law: Some digital falsifications might implicate various criminal laws. If 
a digital falsification targeted particular individuals by using any “interactive 
computer service or electronic communication system” to “intimidate” them in 
ways “reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress,” the creator 
might have violated federal cyberstalking law.18 Some states also make it a crime 
to knowingly and credibly impersonate another person online with intent to “harm, 
intimidate, threaten, or defraud” that person,19 and it is a federal crime to 
impersonate a federal official in order to defraud others of something of value.20 A 
few states also have criminal defamation laws, though prosecutions under these 
laws must at a minimum satisfy the same constitutional standards as the civil 
defamation claims discussed above.21 Finally, some states have criminalized the 
intentional use of lies to impact elections, but most of these laws have been struck 
down as unconstitutional.22 
 
Administrative Law: There may be narrow circumstances in which digital 
falsifications could be addressed through administrative law. The Federal Trade 
Commission could regulate synthetic or manipulated media that amount to 
deceptive or unfair commercial acts and practices, but this remit would likely cover 
only those media that take the form of advertising related to “food, drugs, devices, 
services, or cosmetics.”23 Although the Federal Communications Commission 
might seem like a better fit, that agency currently appears to lack both jurisdiction 
and interest to regulate content circulated on social media.24 Lastly, the Federal 
Election Commission is empowered to regulate campaign speech, but it does not 
regulate the truth of campaign-related speech, nor is it likely to assert or receive 
this power due to the constitutional, practical, and political concerns that would 
accompany such efforts.25 There are election-related rules concerning financing—
for example, regulations demanding transparency of funding for political 
advertisements—but social media are not currently subject to jurisdiction in this 
context.26 This might change if Congress adopts the Honest Ads Act, but efforts 
appear to have stalled on that front for now.27 
 
Five final points are essential to understanding the legal landscape around digital 
falsifications. First, difficulties of attribution will often impede attempts to hold 
creators of harmful falsifications liable; tracking down the people who create them 
is usually difficult and costly. Second, and relatedly, perpetrators often live outside 
of the United States and thus may be beyond the reach of the U.S. legal process. 
Third, it can be expensive and risky to bring civil claims, and victims of harmful 
falsifications may fear that litigation will trigger even more unwanted attention—
sometimes known as the Streisand effect.28 
 
Fourth, legal liability may depend on whether a digital falsification is believable, 
but each case will present different issues on this front. For example, if a deepfake 
portrayed a presidential candidate saying something racist, she would likely have 
to show that people reasonably believed she made the racist statements in order to 
successfully bring a defamation claim. If the deepfake were unbelievable, courts 
would more likely view it as satire or parody and thus deem it protected under the 
First Amendment.29 Although the relevance of believability will depend on the 
type of legal claim and the facts of each case, it is safe to say that believable 
falsifications are both more likely to be legally problematic and less likely to 
receive First Amendment protection. 
 
Last but certainly not least, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act will 
largely immunize social media from most of the potential legal liability discussed 
in this memo. If a third party posts a digital falsification on an online platform, the 
platform cannot be held liable for hosting it even if the third party could be, unless 
hosting the content violates federal criminal or intellectual property law. At the 
very least, this means that platforms are not legally responsible for user-generated 
falsifications that would otherwise run afoul of laws concerning the right of 
publicity, defamation, false light, or IIED. 
Section 230 is especially important here in two respects. First, platforms cannot be 
sued for displaying most content republished from other sources or generated by 
users because the law expressly prohibits courts from treating platforms as 
“publishers” of that content. Second, platforms can filter and block whatever 
content they like without fear that they will be liable for leaving up some types of 
content while taking down others. This combination gives platforms wide 
discretion to allow or prohibit digital falsifications as they see fit. Ultimately, due 
to a combination of Section 230 and the First Amendment, platforms will be 
largely free to regulate digital falsifications however they wish as a matter of 
private governance of online speech. 
Thomas E. Kadri is a resident fellow at Yale Law School and an adjunct professor 
at New York Law School. 
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